











































Whereas	 in	 Finland	 only	 3%	 of	 the	 users	 have	 been	 influenced	 in	 their	 electoral	 decision	 by	 the	
advice	they	received	from	a	VAA,	in	other	countries	the	numbers	are	higher:	6%	in	Germany,	10-15%	
in	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 almost	 70%	 in	 Switzerland	 (Ladner	 and	 Fivaz	 2012).	 Besides	 different	
methodological	 approaches	 between	 the	 studies,	 the	 different	 electoral	 systems	 may	 also	 be	
responsible	 for	 large	 parts	 of	 the	 observed	 cross-country	 variance.	 In	 Switzerland	 voters	 can	 vote	
both	for	parties	and	directly	for	individual	candidates	from	different	parties	(by	splitting	their	votes	
between	 parties).	 Thus,	 being	 influenced	 by	 a	 VAA	 does	 not	mean	 necessarily	 that	 a	 Swiss	 voter	
switched	 completely	 from	 one	 party	 to	 another,	 it	 might	 well	 be	 that	 he	 or	 she	 only	 switched	
partially	or	distributes	the	votes	over	more	parties.	
In	 a	 nutshell,	 previous	 research	 on	 VAA	 impact	 has	 shown	 that	 VAAs	 influence	 their	 users	 in	 the	
following	 ways:	 they	 foster	 voter	 turnout	 and	 also	 have	 effects	 on	 party	 choice.	 It	 is,	 however,	
somewhat	 surprising	 that	 most	 studies	 –	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 a	 few	 theoretical	 contributions	
(Anderson	 and	 Fossen	 2014;	 Fossen	 and	Anderson	 2014;	 Fossen	 and	 van	den	Brink	 2015)	 –	 solely	
focus	 on	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 electoral	 behaviour	 of	 voters,	 but	 do	 not	 explicitly	 address	 questions	
related	 to	 the	 potential	 impact	 on	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 representational	 processes	 as	 a	 whole.	
Questions	like	whether	the	use	of	VAAs	leads	to	better	electoral	decisions	(i.e.,	closer	to	the	personal	
preferences)	 which	 would	 contribute	 to	 the	 improvement	 of	 political	 representation	 have	 been	
neglected	by	VAA	research.	
This	 paper	 intends	 to	 tackle	 this	 research	 gap	 by	 addressing	 the	 following	 research	 question:	Do	
VAAs	improve	the	quality	of	the	representational	process?	The	present	state	of	our	paper	represents	
only	 a	 tentative	 first	 draft.	 Our	 analysis	 applies	 a	 simplifying	 but	 straightforward	 approach.	 We	
analyse	 the	 congruence	 of	 political	 parties	 with	 their	 voters	 on	 a	 number	 of	 policy	 issues.	 This	














competitive	 elections	 with	 multiple	 parties	 and,	 crucially,	 by	 an	 elaborated	 system	 of	 political	
representation	 safeguarding	 that	 parliament	 and	 government	 implement	 policies	 according	 to	 the	
will	of	the	people.	
Even	 after	 almost	 50	 years	 Pitkin	 (1967:	 209)	 offers	 still	 one	 of	 the	 catchiest	 and	most	 influential	
definition	of	political	representation:	




of	 political	 representation.	 And	 second,	 it	 emphasises	 that	 the	 representative	 has	 to	 represent	
actively.	A	 representative	 is	 not	 representing	 specific	 groups	of	 voters	because	he	or	 she	 is	 of	 the	
same	 age,	 gender	 or	 has	 the	 same	 social	 background.	 He	 or	 she	 is	 only	 representing	 a	 group	 of	
citizens	by	acting	actively	in	the	interest	of	this	group	(e.g.,	by	voting	in	accordance	with	the	interests	
of	the	represented	voters	in	parliamentary	votes).	
Pitkin’s	 concept	 of	 substantial	 representation	 –	 standing	 for	 a	 representation	 of	 political	 issues,	








four	 linked	 steps:	 1.	 Citizens’	 preferences;	 2.	 Citizens‘	 voting	 behaviour;	 3.	 Selecting	 policy	makers	
(election	outcomes	/	government	formation);	4.	Outcome	/	implemented	public	policies.	
These	four	steps	are	linked	by	the	citizens’	process	of	electoral	decision-making	and	voting	(linkage	1	
Þ	2),	 the	aggregation	and	 transformation	of	 these	votes	 into	 seats	 in	parliament	and	government	
according	 to	 the	 regulations	 of	 the	 electoral	 system	 and	 the	 process	 of	 government	 formation	
(linkage	2	Þ	3),	and	finally	the	process	of	policy	making	between	elections	(linkage	3	Þ	4).	A	good	
matching	 between	 the	 citizen’s	 preferences	 and	 the	 implemented	 public	 policies	 alone	 does	 not	









guarantee	a	properly	working	 system	of	democratic	 representation	and	 responsiveness	 the	quality	
and	 the	 amount	 of	 available	 information	 is	 key.	Without	 political	 transparency	 and	 availability	 of	
reliable	 and	 comprehensive	 information	 on	 candidates	 and	 parties	 and	 their	 political	 positions	 as	














steps	 in.	 If	 it	 is	 true	 that	 VAAs	 improve	 the	 level	 of	 information	 dramatically	 and	with	 regards	 to	
previous	VAA	research,	which	found	clear	evidence	that	VAAs	are	taken	seriously	and	have	an	impact	
on	 their	 users’	 electoral	 decision	 (see	 Section	 1),	 it	 is	 to	 expect	 that	 voters	 using	 a	 VAA	 exhibit	 a	




According	 to	 our	 research	 question	 we	 intend	 to	 measure	 the	 impact	 of	 VAAs	 on	 the	 quality	 of	
representational	processes	by	using	the	congruence	of	political	positions	between	voters	(including	
VAA	 users	 and	 non-users)	 and	 the	 political	 parties	 they	 have	 voted	 for.	 We	 therefore	 need	
comparable	 data	 on	 the	 political	 preferences	 both	 of	 the	 political	 parties	 and	 of	 the	 voters.	 Our	
analysis	relies	on	two	surveys	conducted	around	the	2015	federal	elections	in	Switzerland.	
The	 first	 survey	 was	 conducted	 by	 the	 Swiss	 VAA	 smartvote	 (www.smartvote.ch)	 among	 all	
candidates	of	 the	2015	elections	and	provides	 the	positions	of	 the	political	parties.	With	 regard	 to	
the	 electoral	 system,	 which	 allows	 not	 only	 to	 vote	 for	 parties	 but	 also	 directly	 for	 specific	
candidates,	any	meaningful	operative	design	of	VAAs	in	Switzerland	is	candidate-centred	(in	contrast	
to	 VAAs	 in	most	 other	 countries	 providing	 their	 services	 on	 party	 level).	 The	 smartvote	 candidate	
survey	contained	75	questions	on	political	 issues.	The	survey	 started	 in	 June	2015	and	ended	with	
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the	 election	 day	 in	October	 2015.	 The	 vast	majority	 of	 candidates	 answered	 the	 questionnaire	 by	
mid-September.	All	 candidates	 running	 for	office	were	offered	participation	 in	 the	 survey.	Overall,	
there	were	 3,873	 candidates	 out	 of	which	 3,267	 or	 84.4%	 answered	 the	 smartvote	 questionnaire.	






which	 is	why	we	abstain	 from	applying	additional	weights	 to	compensate	 for	non-respondents	 (for	
details	 on	 the	 response	 rates	 see	 Appendix	 1).	 The	 positions	 of	 the	 seven	 political	 parties	 are	
calculated	based	on	the	answers	of	the	candidates	from	each	party.	
The	second	survey	we	rely	on	was	conducted	by	the	Swiss	Electoral	Studies	(Selects;	www.selects.ch)	







We	apply	several	 restrictions	 to	 the	Selects	data	set.	First,	we	only	 include	voters	 (the	sample	also	
contains	non-voters)	and	second,	we	include	only	voters	who	have	answered	all	nine	issue	questions.	
As	 further	 restriction,	 as	 already	mentioned,	 the	 analysis	 comprises	 the	 voters	 of	 the	 seven	main	
parties	 only.	 At	 the	 end	 our	 data	 sample	 contains	 3,333	 voters	 –	 among	 these	 582	 have	 been	






using	 voters.	 Previous	 research	 shows	 that	 VAA	 users	 usually	 differ	 from	 non-users	 in	 several	




users	 than	 reported	 in	 previous	 studies	 (e.g.,	 Ladner	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Appendix	 2	 contains	 a	 detailed	
comparison	 of	 the	 two	 sub-groups	 with	 regards	 to	 both	 socio-demographic	 and	 political	
characteristics	like	political	interest,	knowledge	or	the	left-right	self-placement.	Graph	1	below	shows	




















Both	 the	Selects	voter	 survey	2015	and	 the	smartvote	candidate	survey	2015	contained	nine	 issue	


































difference	 between	 voters	 and	 the	 party	 they	 voted	 for.	 The	 first	 measure	 is	 based	 on	
Multidimensional	 Scaling	 (MDS;	 also	 known	 as	 principal	 coordinates	 analysis3)	 which	 provides	 a	
political	 space	 with	 two	 main	 dimensions.	 Whereupon,	 we	 are	 mainly	 interested	 in	 the	 first	
dimension	 coordinates	which	 represents	an	approximation	of	 the	dominant	 left-right	dimension	 in	
Swiss	politics	(Benoit	and	Laver	2006;	Hug	and	Schulz	2007).	The	range	of	the	calculated	coordinates	
lies	between	 -125.8	and	165.4.	A	party’s	position	on	 this	 left-right	axis	 is	defined	as	 the	arithmetic	
mean	of	 the	MDS	coordinates	of	 the	party’s	 candidates.	 The	positional	difference	on	 the	 left-right	
axis	is	the	absolute	difference	between	the	party	coordinate	(mean	of	candidates'	coordinates)	and	
the	 coordinate	 of	 the	 individual	 voter	 of	 that	 party.	 Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 histogram	 with	 the	
distribution	in	the	first	dependent	variable.	The	histogram	shows	the	expected	skewed	picture:	the	













the	median	 answer	 (“party	 answer”).	 Then	 for	 each	 of	 the	 nine	 questions	 the	 absolute	 difference	
between	 the	 voter	 position	 and	 the	 party	 answer	 was	 calculated	 and	 finally	 totalized	 (which	
produces	an	index	of	issue-based	difference	ranging	from	0	to	900).	The	histogram	of	the	distribution	









regression	 models	 on	 the	 two	 dependent	 variables	 measuring	 the	 voter-party	 distance.	 In	 these	
models	we	integrated	the	following	control	variables:	
• Political	 interest:	 The	 respondents	were	 asked	 about	 their	 general	 interest	 in	 politics.	 The	
values	range	from	1	(not	at	all	interested)	to	4	(highly	interested).	We	expect	that	politically	
interested	 people	 are	 better	 informed	 about	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 political	 space	 and	 the	
positions	 of	 the	 parties	 therein.	 Thus	 the	 higher	 the	 political	 interest	 the	 smaller	 the	
expected	positional	distance	to	the	elected	party.	
• Information	 sources:	 The	 Selects	 survey	 contains	 a	 set	 of	 binary	 questions	 asking	 about	






of	 the	 political	 space	 and	 the	 positions	 of	 the	 parties	 therein.	 Thus	 the	 higher	 the	
information	 source	 intensity	 the	 smaller	 the	 expected	 positional	 distance	 to	 the	 elected	
party.	
• Use	of	smartvote:	The	crucial	variable	to	answer	the	research	question	is	the	binary	question	
if	 the	 voter	 has	 used	 smartvote	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 elections.	 We	 hypothesise	 that	
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smartvote	 users	 are	 better	 informed	 about	 party	 positions	 and	 that	 they	 show	 a	 smaller	
positional	distance	to	the	party	they	voted	for.	
• District	 size:	 In	 the	 2015	 elections,	 the	 number	 of	 seats	 in	 the	 electoral	 districts	 (Swiss	
cantons)	 varied	 between	 1	 and	 35.	 Although	 a	 PR	 voting	 system	 is	 applied	 throughout,	 in	
small	districts	 the	PR	system	approximates	 the	effects	of	majority	voting	systems	 (e.g.,	 the	
number	of	running	candidates/parties	is	limited,	as	well	as	the	number	of	candidates	with	a	
real	 chance	 to	 get	 elected)	 (Cox	 1990,	 1997;	 Carey	 and	 Shugart	 1995).	 Because	 of	 the	
restricted	party	supply,	we	expect	larger	positional	distances	in	smaller	districts.	
• Left-right	 position:	 In	 order	 to	 analyse	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 voter's	 left-right	 position	 on	 the	
positional	 congruence	 we	 use	 either	 the	 voters'	 MDS	 coordinate	 on	 the	 first	 dimension	
calculated	from	the	nine	policy	issues	(see	above)	or	the	self-placement	of	the	voter	on	a	11-
point	scale.	Both	variables	are	recoded	in	three	categories	of	equal	range	(left,	centre,	right)	
which	 allows	 to	 single	 out	 the	 effect	 for	 each	 of	 the	 three	 groups	 (reference	 category	 =	
centre).		






the	 elected	 party	 than	 voters	 who	 are	 positioned	 (or	 position	 themselves)	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
political	space.	
Throughout	 all	 four	 model	 estimations	 the	 use	 of	 the	 smartvote	 VAA	 has	 a	 significantly	 negative	
effect	at	 least	at	10%	level	on	positional	difference.4	This	corroborates	our	central	expectation	that	
voting	 decisions	 of	 people	 who	 use	 VAAs	 do	 have	 a	 closer	 match	 with	 their	 personal	 political	
preferences.	
Another	 significant	 variable	 is	 political	 interest	 which	 leads	 as	 expected	 to	 a	 smaller	 positional	
distance	between	a	 voter	 and	 the	elected	party.	 Finally,	 in	 three	models	we	 find	also	 a	 significant	
impact	of	 the	gender	variable	with	 female	voters	exhibiting	 smaller	positional	distances.	 Since	 this	
covariate	was	not	in	the	primary	focus	of	our	analysis	we	can	only	speculate	about	the	reasons.	From	
previous	 VAA	 research	 we	 know	 that	 female	 voters	 are	 more	 insecure	 regarding	 their	 electoral	
choice.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 female	 VAA	 users	 take	 the	 received	 voting	 advice	 more	 seriously	 into	
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Observations	 2,064	 2,064	 2,064	 2,064	







Our	 findings	presented	 in	 this	paper	 show	 that	 the	positional	 congruence	between	voters	 and	 the	
elected	 political	 party	 is	 significantly	 smaller	 if	 the	 voter	 previously	 used	 a	 VAA.	 Considering	 the	
tentative	character	of	this	paper,	we	are	fully	aware	that	our	results	are	preliminary.	Nevertheless,	in	
particular	 regarding	 the	 ongoing	 debate	 about	 the	 dramatic	 alienation	 between	 citizens	 and	 their	
political	elites	as	well	as	about	 the	crisis	of	current	 representative	democracies	 (e.g.,	Merkel	2015;	
Schmitter	 2015)	 we	 consider	 the	 finding	 both	 relevant	 and	 instructive	 for	 the	 future	 debate.	 Our	
results	show	that	the	use	of	VAAs	leads	to	a	reduction	in	the	positional	distance	between	citizens	and	
elected	 elites	 and	 thus	 that	 VAAs	 contribute	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 contemporary	 representative	
democracies.	
There	 is,	however,	much	 room	 for	methodological	 improvement.	We	would	 like	 to	emphasise	 two	
aspects:	 First,	we	 abstained	 from	applying	weights	 (e.g.,	weights	 for	 the	 party	 choice)	 to	 the	 data	
used	 in	 our	 regression	models.	 Even	 if	 we	 do	 not	 expect	 substantial	 changes	 (based	 on	 previous	
analysis	of	this	data),	we	will	check	this	point	in	a	next	version	of	the	paper.	Second,	we	should	try	to	
relax	 the	 restriction	 to	 the	 nine	 smartvote	 issues	 included	 in	 the	 Selects	 survey	 and	 thematically	
broaden	 our	 analysis.	 This	 could	 lead	 to	 much	 more	 detailed	 insights	 into	 the	 quality	 of	
representation	of	MPs	regarding	the	issue	preferences	of	their	voters.	In	this	case	we	would	need	to	
include	smartvote	voter	data	which	bears	a	couple	of	known	methodological	challenges	(e.g.,	lack	of	








studies	 representation	 works	 properly	 for	 the	 rich	 only	 and	 increasingly	 neglects	 low-income	
households	(see	Bartels	2008;	Giger	et	al.	2012;	Gilens	2012;	2015;	for	Switzerland	see	Lloren	et	al.	
2015;	Rosset	2013).	By	including	the	voters’	income	level	into	our	analysis	we	could	test	whether	the	







	 	 	 	
CVP	 462	 386	 83.5	
FDP	 467	 448	 95.9	
SVP	 439	 371	 84.5	
SP	 502	 464	 92.4	
GPS	 388	 341	 87.9	
GLP	 363	 330	 90.9	
BDP	 229	 185	 80.8	
	 	 	 	
Total	main	seven	parties	 2,850	 2,525	 88.6	
	 	 	 	
Other	parties	 1,023	 742	 72.5	
	 	 	 	
Total	 3,873	 3,267	 84.4	





	 sv-V	 Non-sv-V	 V	
	 	 	 	
Gender	(%)	 	 	 	
Female	 42.8	 49.4	 48.0	
Male	 57.2	 50.6	 52.0	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
Age	groups	(%)	 	 	 	
18-24	 19.5	 5.8	 8.6	
25-34	 24.0	 8.8	 11.9	
35-44	 20.5	 13.3	 14.8	
45-54	 19.1	 21.6	 21.1	
55-64	 10.2	 20.0	 17.9	
65-74	 5.7	 18.8	 16.1	
75+	 1.0	 11.7	 9.5	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
Educational	level	(%)	 	 	 	
Compulsory	education	 3.6	 6.4	 5.8	
Basic	vocational	training	 0.3	 1.3	 1.1	
Vocational	education	 20.5	 36.6	 33.2	
Diploma	school	 10.9	 9.4	 9.7	
High	school	 8.9	 5.9	 6.6	
Higher	vocational	training	 17.5	 18.8	 18.5	
University	of	applied	science	 16.6	 7.7	 9.5	
University	 21.7	 13.9	 15.5	
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	 sv-V	 Non-sv-V	 V	
	 	 	 	
Language	(%)	 	 	 	
German	 85.4	 74.0	 76.4	
French	 12.9	 21.3	 19.6	
Italian	 1.7	 4.6	 4.0	
	 	 	 	
Interest	in	politics	(%)	 	 	 	
Very	interested	 32.6	 23.4	 25.3	
Rather	interested	 53.3	 59.2	 58.0	
Rather	not	interested	 13.6	 16.1	 15.6	
Not	interested	at	all	 0.4	 1.2	 1.1	
	 	 	 	
Political	knowledge	(%)	 	 	 	
Low	 1.5	 3.0	 2.7	
Rather	low	 8.6	 12.8	 11.9	
Medium	 21.2	 26.0	 25.0	
Rather	high	 38.5	 36.3	 36.8	
High	 30.2	 21.9	 23.7	
	 	 	 	
Party	choice	(%)	 	 	 	
CVP	 10.3	 12.1	 11.7	
FDP	 12.8	 17.1	 16.2	
SVP	 19.2	 31.3	 28.7	
SP	 20.6	 18.4	 18.9	
GPS	 11.3	 6.1	 7.2	
GLP	 11.8	 3.1	 4.9	
BDP	 3.1	 4.3	 4.1	
Other	parties	 11.1	 7.6	 8.4	
	 	 	 	
Left-right	(self-placement)	(%)	 	 	 	
Left	 12.0	 8.5	 9.3	
Centre-left	 24.4	 14.8	 16.8	
Centre	 34.8	 35.4	 35.2	
Centre-right	 22.8	 30.2	 28.7	
Right	 6.0	 11.1	 10.0	
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	 15.9	 42.9	 39.8	 6.9	 32.4	 30.3	 2.4	 27.6	 26.9	 95.1	 72.1	 68.8	 94.1	 77.2	 77.9	 30.8	 66.1	 69.5	 33.9	 53.3	 61.4	
A	popular	initiative	
demands	that	nuclear	 	 31.6	 69.3	 66.9	 16.4	 58.5	 62.4	 7.2	 50.2	 42.0	 98.9	 90.8	 92.9	 99.7	 98.4	 100.0	 93.4	 89.8	 89.0	 56.2	 74.8	 85.0	
		 	 CVP	 FDP	 SVP	 SP	 GPS	 GLP	 BDP	
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	 40.7	 47.6	 50.3	 14.9	 38.6	 32.2	 8.8	 27.8	 25.3	 92.2	 75.1	 76.8	 84.0	 77.1	 83.8	 30.2	 45.7	 42.1	 31.6	 45.5	 63.5	
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